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Hunting Accident Liability
Vincent A. Feudo*
NCREASED

INTEREST

in hunting for pleasure has led to an in-

creased number of mishaps. Recent statistics show one injury
for every 7,800 hunters, with one in every five or six fatal.'
From early to more recent cases it has generally been held
that where one is not negligent in the handling of his weapon he
is not liable. 2
But "ordinary care" while hunting means a high degree of
care, due to the inherent nature of the sport.3 Thus, in Adams
v. Dunton4 two hunters sat in a boat, hunting ducks. Defendant
hunter was found to be negligent when his rifle discharged, injuring the plaintiff. The bullet entered plaintiff's thigh from the
rear and traveled downward parallel with the leg bone. The evidence showed that defendant's safety catch was "off." He was
found liable for failing to use the care of a person of reasonable
prudence in such circumstances.
Courts recognize that the standards of care to be observed
are peculiar to each specific situation. 5 Precautions must be
taken in accordance with the circumstances in order to avoid
actionable fault.6 Thus it is imperative for one to use a high degree of care when he is in doubt as to what he is shooting at. A
well settled rule is that a hunter must exercise due care to
identify his target, for if he is in doubt, he must not shoot. 7 On
the other hand, a hunter is not liable if a person wanders carelessly or knowingly into a target area while wearing incon* B.S.J., Ohio University; Clerk, Probate Court of Cuyahoga County, Ohio;
Third-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School of Baldwin-Wallace
College.
1 Kelly, Civil Liability for Unintentionally Shooting a Person While Hunting, 15 Wyo. L. J. 88 (1960).
2 Siefker v. Paysee, 115 La. 953, 40 So. 366 (1905); Klop v. Vanden Bos, 263
Mich. 27, 248 N. W. 538 (1933); Moore v. Fletcher, 147 Colo. 407, 363 P. 2d
1056 (1961).
3 Normand v. Normand, 65 So. 2d 914 (La. App. 1953); McLaughlin v. Marlott, 296 Mo. 656, 246 S. W. 548 (1922).
4 284 Mass. 63, 187 N. E. 90 (1933).
5 Davidson v. Flowers, 123 Ohio St. 89, 174 N. E. 137 (1930); Winans v.
Randolph, 169 Pa. 606, 32 A. 622 (1895).
6 53 A. L. R. 1205 (1928); Schouning v. Claus, 363 Mo. 119, 249 S. W. 2d 361
(1952).
7 Koontz v. Whitney, 109 W. Va. 114, 153 S. E. 797 (1930); State v. Green, 38
Wash. 2d 240, 229 P. 2d 318 (1951).
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8
spicuous attire, and is injured by gunfire. If plaintiff himself
is able to avoid peril he is obligated to do so even though defendant may not have exercised due care.
Courts have established that use of firearms while hunting
requires high care.

Persons having control and possession of firearms must exercise the utmost caution that harm may not come to others
from such weapons. The degree of care is commensurate
with the dangerous character of the weapons. The care is
such as ordinary cautious and prudent persons would exercise under similar circumstances. 9
In one case, hunters were returning from a hunting trip. A
loaded gun was placed by defendant in the front seat of a car,
muzzle end toward the back seat. Decedent was shot and killed
when the gun discharged as he attempted to leave the car. The
defendant was found liable for failing to employ care commen10
Whether a
surate with use of a dangerous instrumentality.
hunter was negligent in the handling of his weapon as a dangerous instrumentality is a question for the jury.11
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine often has been applied to
negligent discharge of firearms while hunting. It is regularly
employed in cases where injury occurs to the plaintiff while
the defendant has sole or exclusive control of the firearm at the
12
time when it is discharged.
The res ipsa doctrine usually is invoked when evidence is
slim but fault seems obvious. Growing use of this doctrine in
hunting accidents shows a definite trend to strict liability in the
field. A hunter will be liable under the res ipsa doctrine when a
weapon he is properly holding or firing is negligently discharged. 13 For example, in one case a weapon held by the defendant in such a manner as was safe, discharged and caused
permanent injury to the defendant's leg. The court found the
8 Webster v. Seavey, 83 N. H. 60, 138 A. 541 (1927).

9 Gibson v. Payne, 79 Ore. 101, 154 P. 422 (1916).
10 Nelson v. Lee, 249 Ala. 549, 32 So. 2d 22 (1947); Rudd v. Byrnes, 156
Cal. 636, 105 P. 957 (1909).
11 Ertel v. DeWitt, 60 Ohio L. Abs. 273, 101 N. E. 2d 296 (1949); Bennett v.
Marquis, 325 Mass. 375, 90 N. E. 2d 551 (1950).
12 46 A. L. R. 2d 1217 (1956).
13 Norling v. Carr, 211 F. 2d 897 (7th Cir. 1954); Mobilia v. Blystone, 31
Erie Co. L. J. 307 (Pa. 1948); Annear v. Swartz, 46 Okla. 98, 148 P. 706
(1915).
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defendant liable on the res ipsa principle. 14 Negligent manipulation while in complete control of the firearm constituted liability
under res ipsa. 15
By far the most popular and effective defense employed in
hunting injury cases is contributory negligence. A classic example is found in Wilfirt v. Nielson.10 Here two hunters were
engaged in flushing a quail from the brush. Plaintiff allowed
himself to get so close to the target that he found himself in defendant's line of fire, and was injured when a hail of pellet shot
struck him in both legs. Defendant was found to be 10 per cent
negligent, but the court found the plaintiff to be 90 per cent at
fault. Even though the defendant had a duty to use care, the
plaintiff hunter also had a duty to stay out of the defendant's
line of fire.
Contributory negligence is used frequently as a defense in
instances where the plaintiff becomes aware of the defendant
hunter and fails to use due care while he is firing.1 7 It has been
held that a defendant will not be liable on the theory of contributory negligence where he has stationed the plaintiff hunter
at a certain position and plaintiff strays from that spot knowing
18
full well that defendant may fire.
Contributory negligence has been successfully attempted in
cases where both hunters had knowledge of the other's presence.
A plaintiff shot in the back while standing directly in front of a
loaded firearm that was being properly held by defendant has
been found to be contributorily negligent.1 9 In another case plaintiff was at a vantage point where he could see defendant and
failed to notify him of his presence. His failure to use due care
was found to be contributory negligence. Defendant hunter had
20
no knowledge of plaintiff's presence while firing at a flying bird.
On the other hand, where plaintiff left a formation line of hunters
and was injured by defendant's shot, he was not found to be contributorily negligent. In this instance the evidence showed
14 Huber v. Collins, 38 Ohio L. Abs. 551, 50 N. E. 2d 906 (1942); Zoeller v.
Schmitz, 172 Ill. App. 167 (1912).
15 Mobilia v. Blystone, supra note 13.
16 250 Wis. 646, 27 N. W. 2d 893 (1947); Harper v. Holcomb, 146 Wis. 183, 130
N. W. 1128 (1911).
17 Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P. 2d 1 (1948).
18 Holmon v. Roess, 253 F. 2d 497 (5th Cir. 1958).
19 Johnson v. Holzmer, 263 Minn. 227, 116 N. W. 2d 673 (1962).
20 Blanchard v. Noteware, 263 App. Div. 186, 32 N. Y. S. 2d 188 (1942).
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that defendant had failed to use due care in discharging his
weapon.21

Hunting accidents have become so common in recent years
that several states have adopted legislation making a person
criminally liable when the circumstances show gross or reckless
negligence. New York, a leader in this respect, passed a statute,
in 1953, making a reckless person criminally liable if death reis imprisonsulted from such a hunting accident.2 2 Punishment
23
ment for up to five years, and/or $1000 fine.
It has also been held, in criminal actions, that one using
firearms in hunting must use the care commensurate with the
danger involved, and that negligence in this instance may be
criminal even though one thinks that he is shooting at an ani2
mal. 4

Where criminal responsibility is imposed, the general rules
relating to homicide have been applied to cases in which death
resulted from a hunting accident while firing at game or supposed
game. 25 Yet, a homicide has been found to be excusable in a
hunting accident if the act is a lawful one done with ordinary
20
caution and without unlawful intent.
It has become almost a universal rule that gross or reckless
negligence must be shown in order to make a hunter criminally
liable. The case of People v. Smake 7 points up strongly the
culpable negligence rule. The defendant thought that the decedent was a bear, and without further caution fired into the
bushes, killing him. An autopsy later performed gave as a cause
of death, complications resulting from a gunshot wound. Defendant was found guilty of criminal negligence for failing to be
more certain of his target before firing.
In a similar case the defendant was not liable criminally
where he thought that the decedent was a deer, and shot and
killed him.2 8

Medical testimony showed that decedent met his

DiCostanzo v. Fiumano, 17 App. Div. 2d 787, 232 N. Y. S. 2d 728 (1962).
N. Y. Penal Code, Sec. 1053-C (1953).
23 Ibid., Sec. 1053-D (1953).
24 Anno. 63 A. L. R. 1232 (1929).
25 Anno. 23 A. L. R. 2d 1402 (1952).
26 People v. Joyce, 192 Misc. 107, 84 N. Y. S. 2d 238 (1948).
27 206 Misc. 295, 127 N. Y. S. 2d 556 (1954).
28 People v. Dawson, 206 Misc. 297, 133 N. Y. S. 2d 423 (1954); State v. Jones,
152 Me. 188, 126 A. 2d 273 (1951); but see Fowler v. Monteleone, 153 S. 2d
490 (La. App. 1934).
21

22
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death from a bullet wound which ruptured the aorta. The court
held the evidence to be insufficient as a matter of law, in failing
to establish gross negligence beyond a reasonable doubt. It could
not be shown that defendant had completely disregarded the consequences that might ensue from his act.
Occasionally courts have indicted defendants on the charge
of voluntary manslaughter. This was done where defendant,
hunting birds along a river bank in a sparsely inhabited resi29
dential area, shot and killed a woman in her own driveway.
However, guilt was not established because of the prosecutor's
failure to prove that the act was done in the heat of passion.
Defendants have been convicted of murder where sufficient
evidence showed that the defendant hunter and the decedent
had had words shortly before the alleged accident.30 The decedent, in one such case, was found in an open clearing with a
bullet hole in his back. Defendant's claim that he had thought
that he was shooting at a rabbit did not hold up as a defense.
A conviction of involuntary manslaughter was obtained in
Vires v. Commonwealth.3 1 Here, evidence showed that defendant shot and killed decedent neighbor while both were hunting
in a clear field in broad daylight, and defendant was only 15 or
20 feet away from decedent when the shooting occurred. Defendant maintained that he had mistakenly shot decedent while
firing at a fox. In another case defendant was found guilty of
manslaughter when he allegedly thought that a 15 year old boy
3
wearing a red jacket and shirt was a bear. 2
Mullins v. Commonwealth, 269 S. W. 2d 713 (Ky. App. 1954); Childers v.
Commonwealth, 239 S. W. 2d 255 (Ky. App. 1951).
30 Brown v. State, 203 Ga. 218, 46 S. E. 2d 160 (1948); Simmons v. State, 227
Ark. 1124, 305 S.W. 2d 119 (1957).
31 308 Ky. 707, 215 S. W. 2d 129 (1948).
32 State v. Green, supra note 7; State v. Newberg, 129 Or. 564, 278 P. 568
(1929).
29
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